9 March 2015, Budapest
Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I myself supported the Honourable Foreign Minister’s proposal that from now on we should convene a meeting for our ambassadors twice a year, rather than annually – at least for a year or two, and then review the situation. Those working at the most senior levels of Hungarian public administration, including yourselves, have a high opinion of themselves – and that is just as it should be. But the truth is that making a small change in the daily practice of foreign policy – and in particular, in the way our foreign policy perceived – is a highly complex matter. Therefore, gathering together once a year in order to make our voices heard about what direction Hungary’s foreign policy should pursue falls short of what we need; translating it into day-to-day work and implementing it in specific cases is much harder than one would think. So I agreed to the idea that six months after the announcement of our latest foreign policy doctrine and way of thinking, which – if I correctly remember what the Honourable Foreign Minister said – took place in August, it is worth taking account of the intervening six months. It is worth taking stock of our achievements, and it is worth everyone considering in which specific areas they have succeeded in taking care of business according to the new approach and mentality, and in which ones they have not. I am going to give you a few examples now. I shall, however, not talk about the specifics, because that will be your job today and tomorrow.
For instance, I think that the implementation of a standard organisational management system at foreign representations is a major change in the history of Hungarian public administration. I clearly remember – and I am now completing the ninth year of my postgraduate course in governance – that earlier it was a regularly recurring and insoluble problem, that we would have an embassy headed by an ambassador who did not have clear authority and accountability in respect of other Hungarian foreign representations operating in the same capital – be those trade or cultural representations. Additionally, within a given embassy it was even unclear which members of staff enjoyed special autonomy, with direct accountability to individual ministries. This was something we wanted to change. Over the next two days I think it is very important for everyone to take stock of whether they have succeeded in changing this state of affairs; whether all Hungarian foreign representations have reached the stage at which it is perfectly clear to all members of staff in a given capital or country that instructions come from a single source, and that there is a single organisational head: the ambassador. Naturally, there is a need for professional guidance and consultation with the ministries responsible for various sectors. It is natural that an agricultural attaché should be in contact with the Ministry of Agriculture; when it comes to the person exercising employers’ rights, however, the person setting the direction, evaluating the work completed, rewarding and penalising, acknowledging achievements and identifying deficiencies, it is the ambassador who must have the final word. I do not know whether we have succeeded in achieving this, but I repeat that in the next day and a half it would be worth taking stock of this, not only with regard to our key partners, but all countries with whom we have diplomatic relations.
There is something else that I have experienced in the last six months in my visits to a number of countries. This is the discomfort of pursuing an independent foreign policy, after a foreign policy line which was governed by a different logic. I met several ambassadors who find it difficult to cope with not being popular at present. Not being popular is a problem in general, though it is almost impossible to strive for unconditional popularity in this line of work; this is something we do not always achieve even in our own families. Hungarian foreign policy has had a culture and an ability – and I look upon this as something valuable – to maintain good relations; the ability to always appear to agree on most issues with the country we were in. And now all of a sudden, in a number of cases the instruction is to tell them that we disagree; this is uncomfortable and unpleasant, particularly when compared with the former culture and logic of communication, and the change is difficult to embrace. It takes courage, determination and a balanced character to say what we actually think – which on two to three new issues all of a sudden clearly departs from the views of the given country in which you are serving – whilst ensuring that we do not destroy the possibility of cooperation in that country. This is difficult. I am not going to name specific countries, but I have been to ones where this is most certainly a difficult task. This is true even in some large European countries, and as I glance at His Excellency Ambassador József Czukor I am reminded of my recent visit to Poland, and also my visit to our friends in Lithuania. So I am aware of the problem. And while I come back home, you stay there – this is a big difference. I believe the next one and a half to two days should also be a good opportunity for you to discuss some issues of disposition and temperament which are not exactly professional issues in the strict sense of the term, but nonetheless form part of the development of your line of work; to discuss how you may preserve the ability and possibility to maintain cooperation in countries where our positions on some matters are distinctly different from theirs. This is an ability which mostly comes with experience, but as we have only been on this path for six months, we do not yet have much practice and experience. Therefore, it is worth supporting each other by sharing the knowledge you have.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
In this vein I would now like to share with you a few ideas that may deserve consideration. The first one is whether it is still a valid assessment that we need a foreign policy doctrine based solely on national interests. The essence of this evaluation was that major changes are taking place in the world; we are effectively experiencing the development of a new world order. We find this unusual, because in the 20th century new world orders usually came about rather abruptly – after a world war, for example. The world order after World War I was not the same as the world order before it: for Hungary the situation changed abruptly, and in that new world order we lost our territories, the homelands of entire population groups were annexed by other countries, and all of a sudden we found ourselves in a different reality. The situation was similar after World War II: when it ended, all of a sudden peace treaties led to a new world order within a year or two. A new world order emerged in 1990 as communism collapsed; that, too, was a relatively abrupt change. We are today experiencing a different kind of change. It is not associated with a war, it is not associated with some sudden territorial rearrangement, it is not associated with peace treaties, and it is not associated with the collapse of regimes. Quite simply, running according to the economy’s own logic, it is primarily due to the western world not only allowing other regions – mainly Asian – into the world economic system, but aiding their entry; thereafter inexorable demographic market-wide laws started to operate in the world economy. In other words, things began to change through the globalisation of world trade. This change is not an abrupt one like the ones we learnt about at school, or like the ones that older generations experienced in the 20th century; this change is taking place differently, but it is happening. My first and primary point for you today is that the conclusion we arrived at over the last year continues to remain valid, because recent developments clearly indicate that the world in which we shall live in five to ten years will be different in terms of dominance from the world in which you started your service. One simply needs to look at the world demographic and economic growth data, the status of Europe and the changes in Asia. Shortly I shall also speak about the policy of southward opening and the processes that are taking place in that direction. Consequently, the essence of Hungarian foreign policy is that it should adapt to and prepare for a new world order, and should understand it so that it may acquire a competitive advantage over others by promptly responding to the changes in the world order. This is what the Government expects of Hungarian foreign policy and the Honourable Foreign Minister, and this expectation continues to hold true.
Unusual events. I would like to tell you now that some unusual things happen in a changing world order, unusual things can happen, and one does not know exactly where one stands. And we, Hungarians are at a disadvantage here, because Hungarians have a tendency to see themselves as very smart and shrewd, when all the while they are either the last or the first to be deceived – depending on how you look at it. This is typical of us. We believe ourselves to be very smart, we think we know the ropes, we have a clear vision of what is happening, and then all of a sudden we are shocked when things happen that are in no way connected to our shrewd assessment. Here, for instance, are our relations with Russia. With a sense of panic we survey the possible foreign relations impact of the Russian president’s visit to Hungary, and then we open the papers and see that not only did the Italian prime minister meet him, but he actually went to visit him in Moscow! And not only did they talk, but they set up an investment fund worth a billion dollars. A Russian-Italian investment fund worth a billion dollars in the middle of sanctions! And we are left staring into space with all our smartness and shrewdness. Or similarly, I open the newspaper at the business news, and I read that, in the middle of the sanctions, one of the largest German companies is buying out one of Russia’s largest and most advanced technology companies. We do not yet know whether or not the British will veto this, because it has caused quite a stir; at any rate, however, a German-Russian agreement will come into being. So I would like to tell you that we must move a little closer to reality, and should not just be smart and shrewd in a general sense. Here we do not need intellectual insight; we need the insight of the marketplace, and these are two different things. We still lag behind in terms of this marketplace mentality, which is much more developed in a number of countries in the West than it is here – at least in the United States and in Western Europe. This means representing a position that is tenable on the grounds of principles and that also fully serves one’s best economic interests. In this respect we have a lot to learn. Let us say, for example, that you look at the consequences of sanctions on Russia, and analyse the figures which show us that while we are imposing sanctions on the Russians, they are responding with counter-sanctions against us. If you want to find out whose trade with Russia has expanded, you will find western countries – the largest one for example – for which trade with Russia has increased; and then you will find clever countries – including Hungary – whose trade with Russia has declined. I would therefore like to tell you that this is a time when you should not strive to apply a professor’s intellectual ability to analyse processes. Instead, though everyone understands what is happening when taking care of business, we need to draw the economic conclusions and convert our opportunities into practical benefits, we need to exercise a degree of shrewdness, and we need to rely on all our knowledge and skills.
This is a completely different situation than that which we had earlier, because Hungarian foreign policy always had an aristocratic – or perhaps rather an elitist – quality. This was a great virtue – let us admit it amongst ourselves – because the most highly-qualified people wanted to work in this line of business, in foreign affairs: people who spoke the most foreign languages and had the best education. In every era foreign affairs has drawn from the cream of the Hungarian elite. But the exact nature of the knowledge seen as being valuable is not a secondary consideration. And today the most highly-prized knowledge is not of the same kind that was once most appreciated, but a knowledge of a different nature, which I have just attempted to describe to you.
I believe it is important, Honourable Foreign Minister, that in the day and a half that we have at our disposal we should also face questions such as the extent to which we have succeeded over the past six months in introducing this type of practical knowledge and ability to highly-trained people with extensive expertise. Not to mention the fact that my worthy Italian counterpart not only signed an agreement on a billion-dollar investment fund but also announced that there is a need for autonomy in Ukraine, on the model of South Tyrol. I merely wish to indicate where our room for manoeuvre is. When we speak about what we can and cannot do, and we imagine it in our own heads, we feel the curse of Hungary’s history: we are not strengthened by it, but cursed. We fret over what we can and cannot say and how far is too far; but when we look at what others do, it is suddenly clear that our room for manoeuvre is much wider than we previously imagined. It does not follow from this, however, that I propose you should start talking about South Tyrol yourselves, because “What Jupiter may do, the ox may not.” But even the ox should be allowed to think about what is happening in the world and understand it, and then the ox may see where his limits lie.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let us now talk about eastward and southward opening and about western integration. These are important issues, because they constitute the basis of our policy. From time to time among amateur observers – but luckily, not so much among ambassadors, as that would be a grave problem – the following question is asked: “What about a westward opening?” I would like to point out that there is no such thing. Hungary is part of the West, Hungary is itself in the West. We cannot open towards the West because we are in it. Additionally, this is not a question for debate because, unlike opening towards the east or the south and a number of other policies, it is not the Government that decides the question of western integration. It is not even Parliament that has decided it. The fact that we form part of the West came about as a result of two referenda. I also said this in Parliament, when MPs from Jobbik raised the idea of leaving NATO; I told them that what they ask for is not possible, given that referenda decided on Hungary’s NATO and EU membership. This is a circumstance that no government policy may overrule or seek to overrule. Therefore contrasting our western integration with the policy of eastward or southward opening or any other bilateral or regional policy is nonsensical. This is why I say that it is fortunate that this problem has not yet emerged at the level of ambassadors. The underlying claim is that, based on the current state of Hungarian constitutional law – and we are lucky to have a former President of the Constitutional Court in the ranks of the diplomatic corps – not a single Hungarian public figure has the right to call western integration into question, given that we resolved this issue with referenda, with decisions by the people.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Naturally, here at this point we must also talk about the fact that being part of the West and living our daily lives integrated in the West also involves duties. As far as I can see, there are not many representatives of the opposition here, but I would have asked them, as I now ask you, to consider this: one of the most important elements of our foreign policy in terms of the respect and recognition it commands is our military involvement. Participation in the western military coalitions is important. And this is why, in spite of our difference of opinion with Lithuania over the issue of Russian sanctions and the resulting discomfort, I visited the Hungarian military exercise there, where we have sent Hungarian soldiers. And this is why, even though the governing parties no longer have a two-thirds majority, I urge Hungary’s participation in the military coalitions against Islamic State. I am convinced that belonging to the West is not a question of declarations, but a question of day-to-day actions, and involvement in the western military coalitions is today the most visible – if hazardous – part of our western integration; it is the one that testifies to our commitment the most. We shall therefore present to Parliament our proposal to join the western military coalition, together with the Italians and the Germans, in the fight against Islamic State. It is another matter what the wisdom of Parliament will eventually approve.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Before talking about the new directions of opening, let us talk about a concept – which is common in some countries – that a nation has neither friends nor enemies in the long term, but that a nation only has interests which must be represented. I am not sure who first articulated this idea, but it is sometimes attributed to de Gaulle, and sometimes to Churchill. There is a lot of truth in this idea, but I would not suggest that we embrace it in full. When I say that we should pursue a fundamentally interest-driven foreign policy, I would not venture so far in interest-driven foreign policy as the position taken at times in the course of history by the French and the British, de Gaulle and Churchill, because here we have a community with which we share a common fate: Central Europe will always take priority. There are nations here – from the Poles to the Croats – with whom we share a common history of suffering. This imposes obligations on us, influences our way of thinking, and creates emotions and friendship. Therefore, we must at all times take our Central European commitment into consideration. While today we stress – and shall continue to do so in the next day and a half – that we must pursue our interests, in parenthesis I suggest that we make an exception in this one respect: common Central European interests and our common Central European fate are almost as important for Hungary as its own national interests. This exception should somehow also manifest itself in your communication; for embassies operating in third countries, through cooperation with the Visegrád Four or any other means. Please embrace this mentality, and treat our Central European relations as a special priority.
At the same time, it is also true, Ladies and Gentlemen, and I have experienced it myself recently – I have been a member of Parliament for 25 years, and before that I only observed foreign affairs, but I think I am not wrong when I extend the validity of my message to periods before 1990 – that there has always been a certain line of thinking in Hungarian foreign policy. Whether stated explicitly or not, it has been part of Hungary’s foreign affairs doctrine that our interests coincide with the interests of the great powers under whose influence we come at any given time. We did not think about it in these terms – or at least I do not recall having ever discussed this in detail – but I feel that there is an intellectual legacy which assumes that the interests of Hungarian foreign policy automatically coincide with the interests of the great powers under whose influence we come. I would like to say that this is not, in fact, the case. I shall not consider now whether this was the case earlier, because in politics defining interests is a complicated thing. I would, however, very much like to change this mentality in the future. We must have the courage to say that we may have national interests that are different from the interests of the two or three countries with the greatest influence in the western community. This is not something unnatural but, in fact, a natural state of affairs. To make myself perfectly clear, Hungary’s foreign policy interests do not fully coincide with those of Germany or the United States. They only coincide fully with the interests of a single country: that country is Hungary itself. I am not saying that we should provoke conflicts. I am not even saying that this should be stated openly – but it must be there, at the back of our minds. It is not unnatural for us to identify interests that are different from those of one country or another dominating our world. This is not something diabolical: it is a natural part of our nationally-oriented foreign policy. The matter of how this should be handled – how to implement this in practice, when it is convenient to state our interests and when it is better to keep them concealed, how to represent our interests behind the scenes and when to stand up for them openly – is a matter of expert insight, that you are the masters of. You are best equipped to perceive when and how you should proceed in one country or another, though the instructions of the Foreign Minister may also help at times.
I would therefore like to confirm that the basis of our foreign policy doctrine is the Hungarian national interest. Naturally we must ask how we should define our relations with a country that is important for us when our interests do not coincide with theirs, because this creates a different relationship. I would recommend to you a way of thinking which in essence seeks to find a reference point or policy which enables us to show those countries which are key to our fate how Hungary’s advancement is also in their interests. To put it simply: we must simultaneously see to it that the United States has an interest in the stability and advancement of Hungary; that Germany has an interest in the advancement of Hungary; that Russia, too, has an interest in the advancement of Hungary; that China also has an interest in the advancement of Hungary; and that the Turks likewise see why Hungary’s success is good for them. This is how we should build up Hungary’s foreign policy, on the foundations of these relations. So I repeat: we should not seek uniformity with them – life will take care of that – but we should build a network of relations based on why from their point of view it is important that Hungary should do well. If we find specific means of dong this we will be serving the national interest well in foreign policy.
Let us take an example. Our relations with Germany are good; not merely in the traditional diplomatic sense, but we are able to say that Germany has a vested interest in the advancement of Hungary. If Hungary is not successful, German investments in Hungary worth more than EUR 20 billion will not be successful either. We have linked Germany to the Hungarian system of interest representation by forging ties between advanced Hungarian industry and the industrial zone in Southern Germany, and together with the latter the Hungarian economy is able to thrive. This is something which the Germans themselves have an interest in. How did we do this with the United States? This is a much more difficult story. We attempted to pursue a policy in relation to the United States which focuses on the implementation of investments in Hungary in IT and other areas important to the Americans, but essentially in the high-technology field. If you look at the strategic agreements the Hungarian government concluded, you will find, I think, that more have been signed with American companies than with those of any other country. This is no accident. It is not even mere business logic – there is a conscious foreign policy motivation behind it. It is important for us that quite a few companies seen by the Americans as flagship corporations should not only create successful production sites in Hungary, but should also employ engineers and engage in research and development and that Hungary should, in this sense, work more closely with some large US firms. This has been a special task for the Honourable Foreign Minister, and as the example mentioned before demonstrates, it has been accomplished. The same is true for Russia. It is important to show the Russians that Hungary’s advancement is in their interest, and this requires two things. First of all, we have to make it clear that we are not a hostile country, and secondly, as the customer we must always pay promptly. As far as relations with Russia go, Hungary must be a customer who pays promptly. We must pay for Russian energy and raw materials on time, whilst also not being one of those countries which pursue clearly anti-Russian policy. We have our opinion on what the Russians are doing, and we always have a clear position on the violation of international law: it is something that we cannot accept, and the territorial integrity of Ukraine is part of our doctrine, a determining element of our foreign policy. International law must be respected, and this is an important principle we must stand up for. But this does not mean that we should pursue an anti-Russian policy, because as soon as this happens, Russia sees it has no interest in the advancement of Hungary; this is quite the opposite of what we want.
The Chinese. It is difficult to create a sense of interest with such a difference in size, because what significant interest could an elephant have in the family of a little mouse? China, However, clearly seems to have a foreign policy strategy and a foreign trade strategy in which Central Europe has a role. I do not now want go into the long and complicated strategic game related to China: the free trade talks with Europe, the chances and time scale of that free trade agreement versus those for a free trade agreement with the United States, and so on. But it is obvious that now that the Chinese have opened up towards the world, they do not want to be left out of the global system of free trade, they equally do not want to be left out of Europe, and they see Central Europe as a place through which they can build strong European positions. Hungary should find its own position in this scenario, and must see that China has an interest in the advancement of the Hungarian economy. We have achieved two major results here. It is no coincidence that the Bank of China has established its regional headquarters in Hungary, and that the Chinese tourism centre for Central Europe is also in Budapest. These are not accidents, but the consequences of foreign policy. While I would not claim that people in China await the latest Hungarian macroeconomic data with trembling anticipation – we are not quite there yet – for them it is not irrelevant how the country they have designated as a regional centre performs in the economic sectors which are important for them: whether in that country there is stability, growth, and so on.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I do not want to talk at length now about other relations, but I would just make a comment on Turkey. This may lead us in the direction of a foreign policy lecture, but it might not be an entirely pointless remark. I am telling you this to ensure that we are on the same wavelength. When I think about how you, at your places of work, see a specific event and how I see it in my office – how I see what is happening in the world – I always think about three specific countries, because I believe that historically Hungary’s fate has always been determined by its ties with those three countries. I look at what is happening in the context of its impact on German-Hungarian relations, its impact on Russian-Hungarian relations, and its impact on Turkish-Hungarian relations. These three strong great powers are the ones that determine what happens to us. This has been the case for a thousand years. Without doubt, increased Atlantic influence in the world and the rise of the English-speaking countries have added a new element to the picture, but geographically countries are where they are and do not move. Russia is where it is, Turkey is where it is, and Germany, too, is where it is; meanwhile we are here, between them. These are relations we must continuously cultivate. This is why Turkish affairs are particularly important. I do not now want to talk about the issue of expansion and the nature of that expansion in the Balkans related to Turkey – an image of János Hunyadi is painted on the wall of my office, which is called the Nándorfehérvár Room (in reference to the Siege of Belgrade). That is where the Prime Minister works, and so I am constantly reminded of what can happen in the Balkans. We must pay attention to Turkish relations, and this is why the Turkish prime minister’s visit was important. It is no mere coincidence that we began the year by receiving the German chancellor, the Russian president and the Turkish prime minister. These visits were no coincidence but were part of a programme based on a specific approach to foreign policy. I would like to ask those who are active in Turkish relations to try to build Turkish-Hungarian relations, friendship and cooperation; this is not an easy task, because the structure of the Turkish economy is, in many respects, not complementary to the Hungarian economy but competitive with it, and in a number of areas Hungarian and Turkish products are often rivals on third markets. It is not easy – and simply impossible without good foreign policy – to find the areas in which we can complement each other, rather than compete on third markets. SoTurkish relations are not easy to manage.
I would also like to say a few words about whether our nationally-oriented foreign policy – our foreign policy based on national interests – also has its practical pillars, in addition to the intellectual ones. It is not easy to pursue foreign policy that serves the national interests in a country which has no army to speak of, has no weapons of mass destruction, has no significant reserves of raw materials, and has a market of ten million that cannot be at all regarded as significant or large. We must nonetheless in the very realm of the economy find a reassuring development that gives us cause for some self-confidence, that may serve as a firm reference point and as a sound basis in our nationally-oriented foreign policy. We are part of the European Union; the European Union, however – and the eurozone in particular – will clearly continue to struggle with difficulties for a good many more years. This is something that we shall, no doubt, talk about in our discussions. Let us look at the example of Poland. In recent years, what has been the basis of Polish foreign policy – in my belief the most nationally-oriented in Europe? The Poles built their foreign policy on the foundations of their national interests. I could see this when we went to China, and a Pole who spoke at a conference I attended based his entire presentation on this idea. This has been the case wherever I have gone in the world. They are the ones who have said that they are an island of plenty. Let us look at this: the economic crisis crept into the eurozone and the European economy, but there is a country where growth did not once come to a halt. There was not a single year in which gross national product declined in Poland. They may not have grown at the same rate year after year, but at times when all other economies declined, they continued to grow. It is the only economy, the Poles have said, that stands on its own two feet and is successful; it is there for everyone to see. I believe that Hungary is moving towards a similar situation. I am not saying that others will not be successful, or that we should hope for their failure; we would like them to be successful too. But in the years to come Hungary will be among the most successful European economies. This was already the case in 2014.
There is no other country that has been able to reduce unemployment to the extent that we have, whilst also reducing sovereign debt and producing the second or third highest economic growth rate in the community. And 2014 was not an exceptional year, but just one of many. The next few years will be just such years. I therefore believe that the Hungarian economy’s performance constitutes the foundations of an independent Hungarian foreign policy which focuses on national interests. It is this performance that boosts self-confidence, provides accurate self-assessment and yields a sound basis. In many countries in Europe, if the economy grows, the balance of trade deteriorates. The opposite happened in Hungary last year, in contrast to what had happened for decades before. Our balance of trade improved while the economy expanded. In Hungary a historic dilemma has existed for a hundred years, whereby growth has actually been based on loans from outside, and this has led to a trade deficit. This finally came to an end. For the first time in 60 or 70 years, in 2014 Hungary’s economic growth was not based on external credit: funds were not raised in the form of credit, but through investments. This is a fantastic achievement, an outstanding result. Obviously, as in everything else, you need a bit of luck, but luck alone is not enough. We needed good foreign policy, and we needed united efforts – embodied in our two-thirds majority –enabling members of the business community, workers and the Government to pursue a coordinated economic policy, as has happened for five years now. We needed self-confidence in our foreign policy. In my State of the Nation address I mentioned Tigger from Winnie-the-Pooh: if we bounce too much, it will get us into trouble, so it is important that we do not make this mistake. Moderation and knowing our limits, but well-founded self-confidence which stems from our economic performance at home and elevates us to the ranks of the best in Europe in overall macroeconomic terms. This is the basis of all the bouncing and all the talking, this is why the Hungarians want different things and think differently. We have achievements, on the foundations of which we can afford to do so, and I would like to ask you to express this economic performance in your own conduct – with due modesty but with self-confidence. You should not always boast about them, but the macroeconomic results that Hungary has achieved in the past five years should always be there in your attitude.
As part of this line of thought, I must take stock – but I am sure that the Honourable Foreign Minister will do so himself at some point – of the success of the policy of eastward opening in terms of our foreign trade. The figure or sequence of figures which I work from reads as follows: in 2009 almost 80% of our entire exports went to the markets of the European Union’s Member States. This percentage has now decreased by 5%; the percentage has decreased, but the overall volume has not – in fact it has increased. That percentage has decreased, which means that the percentage of exports to countries outside the European Union has increased – by only 5%, it is true, but it has increased. Our targets are likewise not colossal, because all we would like to achieve is that the ratio of our exports to countries outside the EU reaches one third within a few years – say by 2018; in other words, that one third of our exports are to markets outside the European Union. If you read the figures correctly – which is not easy – the European Union plays such a vital role in our exports that in Europe we are the country in third or fourth position as regards the percentage of European exports related to total exports. This means that around 25 countries have a more diversified exports portfolio than Hungary! On the one hand, it is marvellous that we are able to get by as well as we do in an advanced market like the European Union – this is a fantastic achievement. The EU is a difficult market, a quality market. However, the structure of our exports is not diversified enough, and the approaches of the 25 or so other Member States amply demonstrate that it is wise to aim for one third of exports outside the union.
Finally, we see the policy of eastward opening as a success, in spite of the fact that there is some confusion over the numbers. You will clarify these amongst yourselves. The closure of the Nokia factory demonstrates only too well that our exports can decline on the markets of third countries over which we have absolutely no control. But as Nokia supplied products from Hungary, this is a figure that hits the Hungarian balance of trade. It also draws attention to the fact that it is not enough to only look at the macro-data and aggregated figures of our export performance; its structure is also important, and we can clearly see that a great part of our export performance originates from the production or distribution centres of large international organisations in Hungary, rather than from the production of Hungarian small and medium-sized enterprises or large Hungarian corporations. This clearly shows, I think, that it was reasonable to merge foreign trade and foreign representations’ policy, because we must also seek to increase the percentage of exports from Hungarian small and medium-sized enterprises or large Hungarian-owned companies within the aggregated export figures through Eximbank and other agencies, as well as through a number of other means placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. We do not merely wish to achieve an absolute increase in the figures but also a qualitative structural change, and this is why opening doors for Hungarian small and medium-sized enterprises will continue to remain an important task in the period ahead.
As regards the policy of eastward opening, I can tell you that it has been accomplished. I could say that this is now a fact, case closed. The gate is open in the easterly direction. We must communicate through that gate. We must make sure that it is not slammed shut. But we must now turn in another direction, and this is the southerly direction, because in addition to the East, the opportunities for the Hungarian economy appear to be above average in the South. We hope to see a process of consolidation in Africa; in the next decade we can expect the highest growth in the world economy in Africa. Asia will hold on firmly for a while longer, but it is obvious that the enormous annual growth rates that we have seen there cannot continue indefinitely. The figures for the largest Asian country, China, already testify to this. We do not know exactly how long this high growth rate can be sustained. Everyone agrees, however, that there are limits, and the growth potential of strengthening economies begins to diminish. The higher you are, the more difficult it is to grow at the same dynamic rate as that through which you arrived at that high position. And we believe that if Africa finally achieves stability, the continent will present a great economic opportunity for the world economy in the period ahead. If you look at foreign policy in the region, there is a reason why you can see a great deal of activity, a great deal of foreign policy activity there.
And there is another region of southward opening which has traditionally been relegated to the realm of routine duties in Hungarian foreign policy and in Hungary’s economic policy. This is Latin America, which we must deal with as there are large emerging economies there. All this means that this year the Prime Minister’s foreign policy programmes will continue to focus on Asia; before the end of the year, I shall visit the countries which I have not yet been to as part of the policy of eastward opening. We shall go to Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia; perhaps we shall also visit Vietnam or Mongolia. We have yet to finish this job, and must also visit the more remote parts of the world. In the second half of the year, the Foreign Minister will embark on a series of visits in preparation for the process of southward opening. We shall open embassies, consulates and trading houses, and these regions will be the focus for the Prime Minister’s foreign policy work in 2016. I shall visit these countries as the head of business delegations. This is the plan, and we shall then be able to implement the policy of southward opening within a year or two, just as with the policy of eastward opening. I am asking the ambassadors serving in those countries to make the necessary preparations.
Finally, I should also talk about Ukraine, because one of the most visible signs of an evolving new world order is something that earlier seemed inconceivable: there is war on the territory of one of Hungary’s neighbours. If anyone had said at any time over the last 25 years that this was a possible scenario in Ukraine, we would have thought they had lost their mind. The situation is, however, that not only is there a military conflict taking place, but we can clearly see that this will be a long, drawn-out conflict because we cannot see the chances of a rapid and full resolution. We can see promising signs of a possible resolution in the ceasefire agreement. The term clearly indicates that it is not a peace treaty but a mere ceasefire on the path to a peace treaty, but as yet we are very far from the definitive closure of the conflict through an internationally recognised, legitimate peace treaty or agreement. At any rate, the ceasefire is very valuable for us. First of all, because we are a neighbouring country. Let us not underestimate the significance of a military conflict in a neighbouring country. Even if the country in question is vast, and hundreds of miles separate that country’s neighbouring border from the region where acts of war are taking place. One is tempted to believe that it does not affect us because it is so far away. I would point out that the emergence of military conflict in any part of a country is capable of destabilising the entire country. There is a constant threat of destabilisation. This is what we are facing in Ukraine. The Ukrainians are right to make every effort to achieve a ceasefire, because they know precisely that if there is military conflict on a country’s territory, however far it is from the capital, it is capable of destabilising the entire country. The destabilisation of Ukraine runs opposite to the best interests of Hungary. One of the most important pillars of the Hungarian geostrategic concept – if not the most important one – is that there must always be something between Russia and Hungary. We do not want a common border; there must be something there: a sovereign state, the bigger the better. This is not only in the interest of Ukraine. This is also Hungary’s elemental interest. And it was one of the most important benefits of the great geopolitical realignment that started in 1990, because before that we shared a border with the Soviet Union. We appreciate how highly valuable it is for us not to have such a border, even if normally we do not talk about this, and in particular not this openly. Therefore, the survival, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine is an elemental Hungarian interest. Consequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade must specifically address this issue on a continuous basis.
Congratulations on the intense efforts we have made in this department. I wish to thank Ambassador Keskeny as well as the relevant division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Not in a long time have we seen such intensive and coordinated aid policy, and such proactive foreign policy efforts aimed at the ongoing building of relations as those recently witnessed. The situation of the 150–200,000 Hungarians who live there is a particular priority for us; we put this into words by saying that we have 200,000 valid arguments for peace. We shall now launch investments, and it would appear that there will even be funds available from the Hungarian budget to build roads and buildings and to implement developments in general there; this logically follows from the foreign policy doctrine I have outlined just now.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I have now come to the end of my address. I would now like to give you a summary, and afterwards, if you are not too tired and are so inclined, we may even have questions and answers and further contributions.
The first thing is that a major world economic and political shift is taking place, and understanding, evaluating and adapting to this shift constitutes the core of Hungary’s foreign policy. Hungary is not playing a determining role in this process of global realignment, because it has neither the military might, nor the economic strength to justify active involvement. The unconditional representation of Hungarian interests in this great transformation is, however, a fundamental expectation. Consequently, we should not define Hungary’s foreign policy in terms of a need for involvement in the shaping of the greater processes; it is not our job to resolve issues that we cannot resolve – either intellectually, or in practical terms. We must understand and resolve our own questions, the Hungarian questions. In this sense, on our map Hungary is the centre of the world. No one else is, of course, aware of this, but as far as we are concerned, this is how our map has been laid out. And quite a few expectations stem from this approach as far as you are concerned. I am now going to say things that are not usually said in Hungarian foreign affairs and in Hungarian politics in general; but I have considered them carefully, and I would like you to understand them clearly.
The first point is that a diplomat cannot be cosmopolitan. A person who does not view the world as a Hungarian will not be viewed by the world as a Hungarian. How then do we represent our national interests? I would like to make it clear that we need a diplomatic staff with national commitment; this does not mean that you cannot hold dual or even triple nationality; it does not mean that your horizon must end at Hegyeshalom or Záhony. I am not talking about provincialism, but about national identity and the emotions that are associated with it. This is what should motivate you, as we in the Government are motivated by this calling. And this is what should coordinate our movement, this should be the reason for everything we do. As a Hungarian you can be elegant, as a Hungarian you can be non-provincial, as a Hungarian you can use your cutlery properly, as a Hungarian you can speak foreign languages, and as a Hungarian you can take part in international discourse. I am asking you to find all these things, and to implement and embody them in your work. It follows from this that you should not represent illusory theories, romances or ideologies but must represent the national interests of the Hungarian state of ten million and the greater Hungarian world of thirteen to fifteen million.
In summary at the end of my address, I should only answer a single question: does this pay off? We do not know. We may recall periods in Hungarian history or may cite studies and stories which prove that shrewd subservience may yield more benefits than staunch resistance. I shall not cite here the well-known exchanges between rebels fighting for the national cause and Habsburg loyalists; but we can draw one lesson from the history of Hungarian politics: in the long run only a sovereign foreign policy pays off. Therefore I believe that while in the short term some other solution may hold out the promise of greater benefits, in the medium term and in the long term only a foreign policy firmly rooted in national sovereignty can pay off. Because, Ladies and Gentlemen, if we strip relations between nations to their bare bones, there are only two kinds of relations. You are either a servant or a partner. A partner that is not equal will become a servant – it is just a question of time. I would therefore ask you to pursue a Hungarian-friendly policy, a foreign policy that is based on national interests, and to banish subservient attitudes: to favour gestures, positions, attitudes and foreign policy arguments based on partnership.
Looking back at the last six months from this point of view, I believe you have done well. I could also say that we have done well – if you do not find this an exaggeration. I believe that the Prime Minister’s Office has also played a role in this foreign policy, and I think we have covered a much greater distance, we have come much further in the right direction than I had previously thought possible. To change over in six months from a completely different mentality – a mentality that fundamentally sought to target, designate and acquire our position in the western community – to the foreign policy concept of an entirely different era is, I believe, a remarkable achievement. I cannot say that everything has been settled – we are very far from that. Neither can I say that all our foreign relations are in order, or that we have carefully considered every conceivable issue. I am also unhappy that we do not at the moment have a foreign policy periodical that we can all read and that would cover these issues continuously, thereby creating a forum for debate. So there is a great deal still missing from our national foreign policy, which we must create and make up for during the period to come. But we have time, we have the opportunity, and the results we have achieved are promising. Thank you for your work.
Thank you for your attention. I am at your disposal.